[Q&As] Will South Korea's peace gesture work?

‘Pyongyang will never go for peace treaty with Seoul'

By Kim Jae-kyoung

There has been a debate over President Moon Jae-in's conciliatory approach toward North Korea amid heightened tensions in the wake of the North's first test-launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The Korea Times interviewed four international experts on East Asia and North Korea to analyze his strategies. The following discussion has been reconstituted based on separate interviews conducted through phone calls and emails between July 7 and 10. ― ED.

Balbina Hwang, special adviser on East Asian affairs in the George W. Bush administration

Tara O, adjunct fellow at the Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

William Brown, adjunct professor at Georgetown School of Foreign Service

Sean King, senior vice president of New York political consultancy Park Strategies

Q: During the G20 summit in Germany last week, Moon introduced his initiative for an inter-Korean summit to discuss a peace treaty with a more practical package including family reunions. What do you think of his peace gesture while the North is continuing missile launches? Do you think it is a viable option at this point?

Balbina Hwang: I was rather perplexed to hear Moon's proposals in Berlin. These statements and intentions seem contradictory with his statements and reactions to the ICBM launch, and also to his persistent stance that North Korea must denuclearize.

The obvious reason why there has been no peace treaty for almost 65 years is that the two Koreas ― and supporting allies ― have never been able to accept the terms for peace. Neither Korea has been willing to accept the full legitimacy of the other, as each state currently is. Making this problem worse, for the last 30 years, since the early 1990s, North Korea has now become a nuclear weapons state. This has made it impossible for South Korea and allies, and even Russia and China, to negotiate any peace treaty, as long as the North remains a nuclear state.

William Brown: In my view, Moon would do much better starting his administration by talking tough on Pyongyang, as he did in Washington, gaining room later to take a softer line. In Germany, he proposed peace treaty talks in the right way ― including the obvious point that all parties, including South Korea, take part ― but that, of course, is unlikely to fly given Pyongyang's view that only the signatories to the armistice have a seat at the table.

Tara O: Moon certainly is persistent in seeking dialogue with Kim Jong-un, but there are two problems. One is he is going against the tide. As North Korea further develops its capability to build a nuclear missile that can reach the U.S., the more urgent the threat becomes for the U.S. The U.S. is considering all options, including military ones, to not allow North Korea to become a direct threat. The other problem is that Kim is not interested in having talks with Moon, because it's contrary to Pyongyang's efforts to sideline Seoul as an insignificant actor.

Hwang: There is another problem with Moon's proposal. Who are the "parties" to the Korean War? Technically, legally, there are only two ― North Korea and the U.N. forces. North Korea, the U.S., and South Korea are not legally the combatants. As you know, South Korea never signed, because Rhee Syngman refused. My personal belief has long been that a peace treaty must be negotiated and signed between the two Koreas, and only these two. But because legally the U.N. forces represented South Korea during the war, the treaty should be supported fully, and endorsed by U.N. forces, which continues to be led by the U.S.

Sean King: It'd be ridiculous for the U.S. to sign any peace treaty with North Korea because the North attacked the South, not the U.S. or the other way around. This is thus a matter between Seoul and Pyongyang. It's Seoul's own business if Moon wants to sign a peace treaty with Kim Jong-un but Kim would never go for it anyway, as it'd require Pyongyang's recognition of the South and would debunk his regime's false ultranationalist narrative that his grandfather was defending the peninsula against U.S. forces. The U.S. could in theory sign a parallel agreement with Beijing but it's a moot point, as Pyongyang would never sign any such underlying treaty with Seoul to begin with.

Brown: As a lawyer, Moon surely should understand Pyongyang's tactics. It tries to trap our side in twisted legal logic and then, at a time of its choosing, it declares something we do to be in violation of the deal and uses that excuse to do whatever it wants to do. So if Pyongyang really wants a peace treaty, it must do something to prove it actually wants peace. Stopping the nuclear program would show it is sincere.

Hwang: Every South Korean president, even Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, and now Moon, have unequivocally stated the North must be non-nuclear. Yet, very clearly, the North will not denuclearize before negotiations for peace. So, then, how can Moon call for a peace treaty if the North takes no action or effort to denuke?



Q: Can you provide any advice for President Moon on how to deal with North Korea?

O: Moon should consider increasing the cost to North Korea by focusing on sanctions, increasing military preparations and enhancing coordination with the U.S. The secondary sanctions against Chinese banks and entities have begun to increase the cost to China for not doing enough to discourage North Korea's nuclear weapons program. He should also send the signal to North Korea that the combined South Korea-U.S. military stands ready to defend South Korea, which, to be credible, includes the complete deployment of THAAD, if the need arises. Leave the door open to dialogue, but stand in the position of strength!

Hwang: Having a conciliatory approach to the North is simply not enough to improve either inter-Korean relations or for the goal of denuclearization. The reason is not because dialogue or engagement is wrong in principle, but because in order to achieve the two stated goals above, it requires Pyongyang's participation.

King: What South Korea says actually isn't all that important to Kim Jong-un, as the North's singularly focused on its position vis-a-vis the U.S. Pyongyang sees itself as the true Korean government and insists on directly dealing only with the U.S. But for the U.S. to let Kim come straight to the U.S. without his first acknowledging Seoul would undermine our own Korean ally. Similarly, we recognized East Germany in 1974 but only after the two Germanies recognized each other in 1972.

German unification didn't happen because West Germany reached out to its eastern counterpart, but rather it happened because Moscow chose to no longer support East Berlin and East Germany thus collapsed. Hence North Korea's collapse is the only real avenue toward any favorable Korean unification scenario.

Brown: So how can Moon constructively engage North Korea? Here are several suggestions. First, invite them to participate in the Winter Olympics, as long as there are no more long-range missile or nuke tests. Second, offer to re-engage talks on the Gaeseong and Mount Geumgang projects but with the condition that these are to be about economic development using a market, not state, approach. Also, negotiate resumption of family visits but with no payments to the North Korean government. If a system can be built to ensure that payments go directly to the families, allow South Korean families to make significant gifts.

Hwang: Moon has said the North must at a minimum immediately stop further advancements, and has offered a freeze. But Pyongyang is not accepting this proposal. So I cannot offer advice to Moon on his current policy, because it is already not working. However, I do think his actions thus far, showing strong resolve especially after the most recent ICBM test, are very good and a positive sign at least for now about the alliance. In particular, the trilateral show of air exercises among South Korea, the U.S. and Japan was excellent.

Brown: It is clear that at some point Moon will want to meet Kim. That will likely be fine as long as the meeting does not occur in North Korea or in China. So Moon needs to begin developing the concept of a summit held either at a resort in South Korea or in some other country, maybe even in Hawaii or someplace like that. The reason I say no to North Korea is the horrible history we have of high-level visitors to Pyongyang who, every time, come back empty-handed, looking diminished.

Hwang: The North will certainly not stop its actions for promises of cooperation, but at least a strong show of force, deterrence and defense has shown historically to work in limiting some of the North's most provocative behavior. For now, until the North shows any positive change in behavior, such a strong alliance deterrence must continue. The next test for Moon and whether he will have to alter his strategy will come soon with the future deployment of THAAD, and also when the North tests another nuclear weapon.